

## **Implications of Globalisation on European Security: Black Sea Region in the Context of the Future Eastern Enlargement**

**George IVANIASHVILI\***

As globalisation is forcing the European Union in the early 21<sup>st</sup> century into a global orientation which transcends the original *raison d'être* of European integration, Europe is challenged with nothing less than re-inventing itself as a global player and is turning from an internally-driven object to an externally-oriented subject of the world politics.

Security is a more contested idea, but may provisionally be understood as the protection of a people from external threats, and includes arrangements for defense and deterrence. Now while European integration generally refers to the development of European unity among the Twelve<sup>35</sup> in the context of the Treaty of Rome, European security is generally considered within the context of the North Atlantic Treaty. Thus the transition from the familiar debates in the field of European security, where integration meant no more than international cooperation, to a new debate in the context of the process of European political integration, involves the coming together of historically separate traditions of thought.

While the transatlantic security partnership will remain the most important pillar in a global role for Europe, the European Union will have to develop a much higher and ambitious profile for relating with the other regions of the world. Europe's *raison d'être* will increasingly be measured by the degree of security and by European contributions to global order-building.

The latest round, completed in May, 2004 with the accession of ten new members,<sup>36</sup> is even more problematic since it takes the EU into a completely new geography and a set of neighbors with which it has so far had limited experience. New rounds (expected to be completed with Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey), enlargements will extend the EU even further to the East—to the shores of the Black Sea. This will make EU a Black Sea player, sharing its riches as well as its problems with instability-prone states. Taken together, these enlargements will transform the shape of the European continent, drawing borders between the EU and non-EU Europe more or less permanently. As the EU is fast approaching its final borders, not only the member states but also those left out are looking apprehensively to see what the implications of enlargement will be and how the EU will proceed with its external relations. How the EU handles being transformed from a Western European institution to a Europe-wide entity will determine future security developments across wider Europe, including non-EU Mediterranean, Black Sea and South Caucasian countries.

The collapse of the Soviet geopolitical system after the end of the Cold War brought about new strategic alignments in Eurasia. Situated at the crossroad between Europe and Asia, as well as Russia and the Middle East, and linked to southern Europe with access to the Mediterranean and Central Europe, the Black Sea is more than a

---

\* Chairman, The International Centre for Social Research and Policy Analysis

<sup>35</sup> Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom

<sup>36</sup> Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia

region of local strategic importance, representing 'an axis of increasing geopolitical importance and security in the enlarging European Union'.<sup>37</sup>

With its mosaic problems, and their potential consequences, the wider black sea region is one of the most important challenges that the enlarged European Union will face. So far, the EU and the Black Sea Region are linked together by a member state (Greece) and accession countries (Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey). Once Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey become EU members, the Union will directly border the Black Sea, accounting of half of its coastline. The question now is not whether but rather when the EU will become a Black sea Power. In that case it will have to develop policies for regional issues and deal with threats, because it will be virtually impossible to prevent various crises around the Black Sea from affecting EU Europe. Finding the ways to prevent destabilizing factors from arising at the regional level and dealing with them before they affect the EU area will be a trial for the enlarged Union.

The geopolitical importance of Black Sea Region stemmed in the 1990s because of their ethnic, political, economic and military instability. The first decade of the Twenty First century provides new opportunities of utilizing the economic potential of the Black and Caspian Sea, which are really indispensable in conducting the stability and developing prosperity of the Euro-Atlantic civic and security space eastwards.

Although the EU has so far consistently favored individual country approaches in the region, I think that it is necessary to develop a regional approach toward the Black Sea and enhance institutional linkages with regional organizations in order to ensure the smooth transformation of the troublesome states in the wider Black Sea region into viable and stable entities, and to facilitate their further integration into the emerging European architecture.

Since Turkey is an EU candidate country, EU will probably welcome Turkey's role as a transit corridor as much as Ankara will. Transit and sale of energy resources, and gas in particular, are expected to provide a major source of income for Turkey and a tool by which Ankara will be able to build its position in the region.

Presently there are several gas pipelines connecting Turkey with the Eurasian deposits. The most important and the largest of them are Russian routes, including the Trans-Balkan gas pipeline and the recently built Blue Stream. A route connecting Iran with Turkey has also been operational for two years. The Baku–Tbilisi–Erzurum (BTE) gas pipeline has also been completed. It will transport Caspian (Azeri) gas to the Turkish market. However, routes connecting Asia Minor with the continent need to be established in order for gas coming into Turkey to flow to Europe. There are several such projects, and most of them are supported by the European Commission, as they will potentially increase the EU's energy security and serve as a confidence building measure between Turkey and Greece, the Balkan countries and the post-Soviet area.

Since the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, within the region, the Black Sea countries have created a multitude of intergovernmental and non-

---

<sup>37</sup> EU Commission, Press Release, Brussels, IP/01/1531, 31 October, 2001. A political construction rather than simple geographical space, the Black Sea region includes riparian states (Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine) as well as nearby states (Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Greece, Macedonia, Moldova, Serbia and Montenegro).affected by and affecting developments across a broad region from South-Eastern Europe to the shores of the Caspian.

governmental organisations and cooperation schemes. With the recent enlargement of the European Union, the region stands to benefit from the experience and stability of the latter. The Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) organisation, bringing together 350 million people in the area covering 20 million square kilometres, is the most comprehensive and institutionalised structure. Since its initiation in 1992, it has succeeded in creating an extensive cooperation scheme in one of the most conflict-prone regions of the post-Cold War World. Despite the number of ethnic-political conflicts the region has faced, the BSEC, with its wide-ranging interests and declared intention of cooperating closely with the EU, has been able to establish a permanent dialogue among its member countries towards mutual economic benefits.

Apart from enlargement-related issues, a number of existing concerns in the region link Black Sea politics to the European Union. First of all they are connected via the energy dimension. As European dependency on Middle Eastern oil and Russian natural gas continues, together with declining North Sea production, the safe and uninterrupted supply of new energy sources from the Caspian Basin through and around the Black Sea region assumes great importance. Consequently, the question of the security of Europe's energy supplies inevitably brings a number of related Caspian issues to Europe's doorstep, so that the national interests of European states are affected by region's instabilities and structural problems. Integration of the Black Sea markets into Europe will be a significant advantage from a purely economic perspective. But beyond that, threats to stability of the Black Sea region, an obvious gateway between energy rich Central Asia, the Caucasus and Europe without much alternative, would eventually affect European economies. Therefore, the EU is naturally interested in the resolution of conflicts in the region and in changing the code of conduct between regional countries.

A shared neighborhood implies burden-sharing and joint responsibility for addressing the threats to stability created by conflict and insecurity and EU should take more active role to facilitate settlement of the disputes over Palestine, Western Sahara and Trans-dnestria. In my opinion frozen conflicts in South Caucasus represent serious threat to the security and stability on European continent. If not settled those conflicts may provoke greater players Russia, Turkey and Iran to become involved. In addition there are many similarities between the Caucasus and the Balkans. Both are parts of Europe and most of the entities in each sub-region are politically committed to eventual integration in the EU. The one essential difference between the Balkans and the Caucasus is that the latter is either the home of, or the preferred conduit for, huge hydrocarbon and other resources of strategic value. In its resolution of 28th February 2002 the EP stressed the necessity for EU to play more active role in the process of conflict resolution in South Caucasus.

Since the tremendous political changes, which took place in Georgia in 2003, the European Community has been demonstrating to South Caucasus an increased attention, which has already been translated into the concrete policy initiatives. On 14 May, 2004 the General Affairs and External Relations (GAERC) Council in Luxembourg adopted a decision to include the three countries of the South Caucasus—Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia into the European Neighborhood Initiative, which marks a significant step for the territorial integrity into the European Community and strongly encourages to pursue the peaceful resolution of the internal conflicts. South Caucasian countries owing to their geographical position, history, culture and traditions, constitute a strategically

important region for the EU in terms of their common foreign and security policy as well as a genuine gateway to Central Asia. Stabilization of situation in the region, enhancing regional co-operation and more intense relation with enlarging EU represents main task of Georgia for a short - term period.

The EU has a strong interest in the stability and development of Georgia and this interest is to see reinforced, credible and sustained commitment toward democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights and progress towards the development of market economy. This interest should facilitate greater EU political involvement in conflict prevention and crisis management in Georgia, so far as frozen conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia represent serious threat to the security and stability on European continent. Peaceful settlement of internal conflicts will enable Georgia to enhance regional co-operation in different fields, which will be very important to create strong and transparent legal framework that will ensure the implementation of modern Western standards, investments and access to markets. Special importance should also be paid to ensuring poverty reduction, economic growth, establishing stable social protection system including the pension reform, reform in higher education and health care systems.

Georgia's integration into the European Union critically depends on adherence to the principles of democracy, human rights, rule of law, pluralism, and transparency, as well as on successful reforms, which requires systematic adoption and implementation of shared European values in all areas of governance and civil society.

Full integration into EU markets and society requires corresponding transport, energy and telecommunications networks. Georgia is actively engaged in programs realizing the above-mentioned goals through intense co-operation with its European partners. The efforts taken in this direction are mainly concentrated on establishing strong and sustainable transport and energy corridors and their effective maintenance by modernized telecommunication network across the whole region. These efforts are classified in the following three main fields: Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia (TRACECA), strategic energy corridor (INOGATE) and telecommunication network.

As growing attention is being paid to the significance of global processes for an understanding of complex political, social, economic and cultural changes in the world, making progress in moving rapidly ahead through successful reforms should pave the way for the deeper European integration of Black Sea Region and the wider application of European models and standards in national realities.

Thus, due to its geopolitical location and its historical links with many Eastern communities Black Sea region may become a bridge between the East and the West, a mediator and disseminator of the Western ideas and security paradigms in large regions of the Eurasian super-continent.

## References

1. Peter Jankowitsch, 'Neutrality after the Cold War', *Austria Today*, 4/90, p. 5. 'Council Conclusions on Wider Europe—New Neighbourhood', June, 2003
2. "European Security and Defence in the Transatlantic Agenda", *EU/US News; A Review of Transatlantic Relations*, II (April 2000).
3. David C. Gompert, National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, *Strategic Forum*, 129 (October 1997), p. 1.
4. Anne Hammerstad, "Whose Security? UNHCR, Refugee Protection and State Security After the Cold War," *Security Dialogue*, 31(4): 391-403.
5. Stephanie Anderson, "EU, NATO, and CSCE Responses to the Yugoslav Crisis: Testing Europe's New Security Architecture", *European Security*, 4 (Summer 1995): 329-30.
6. Sean Kay, *NATO and the Future of European Security* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998)
7. *Strategic Survey 1996-1997* (Oxford: Oxford University Press for The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1997), p. 105.
8. *BSEC Economic Agenda for the Future: Towards a more Consolidate Effective and Viable BSEC Partnership*, 2001
9. Yannis Papanikolaou, 'Preface' in Terry D. Adams et al., *Europe's Black Sea Dimension*, Brussels, 2002
10. Derleth, J. William, *The Transition in Central and Eastern European Politics*, 2001
11. Stefano Silvestri, *Space and Security Policy in Europe: Executive Summary*.
12. Howard J. Wiarda, *European Politics in the Age of Globalization*, Fort Worth: Harcourt Publishers 2001
13. Saskia Sassen/Kwame Anthony Appiah (ed), *Globalization and its Discontents*, New York: New Press 1998
14. Martin Albrow, *The Global Age. State and Society beyond Modernity*, Stanford: Stanford University Press 1997
15. Thomas Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*(rev.ed.), New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux 2000
16. Peter van Ham, *European Integration and the Postmodern Condition. Governance, Democracy, Identity*, London/New York: Routledge 2001, p.30
17. George Ross, *European Integration and Globalization*, in: Roland Axtmann (ed.), *Globalization and Europe. Theoretical and Empirical Investigations*, London/Washington: Pinter 1998, p. 165
18. Peter Duignan/L.H.Gann, *The United States and the New Europe*, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1994
19. Amy Verdun, *European Responses to Globalization and Financial Market Integration*, Houndmills:Macmillan 2000;
20. Theodore Kokkinos, *Economic Structure-Functionalism in European Unification and Globalization of the Economies*, Frankfurt/New York: Peter Lang 2000
21. Steven Weber (ed.), *Globalization and the European Political Economy*, New York: Columbia University Press 2001
22. Ash Amin/Nigel Thrift (eds.) *Globalization, Institutions, and Regional Development in Europe*, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1994;

23. Randall W. Kindley/ David F. Good (eds.), *The Challenge of Globalization and Institution Building. Lessons from Small European States*, Boulder: Westview 1997;
24. Lloyd Gruber, *Globalization and Political Conflict: The Long-Term Prognosis*, American Institute for Contemporary German Studies: Seminar Papers # 15, Washington 2001
25. Susan Strange, *Europe's Future in the Global Political Economy*, in: Thomas Row (ed.), *Reflections on the Identity of Europe. Global and Transatlantic Perspectives*, Bologna 1996, pp. 27 ff.
26. Larry Siedentop, *Democracy in Europe*, London: Allen Lane 2000
27. Charles Tilly (ed.) *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1975, p.15
28. Peter van Ham, *European Integration and the Postmodern Condition*, op.cit., p. 15
29. Joseph H.H. Weiler, *Community, Member States and European Integration. Is the Law relevant?*, in: *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol.21, no. 1-2 (September/December 1982); Marcus Höreth, *Stille Revolution im Namen des Rechts?*, ZEI-Discussion Paper C 78/2000 (Center for European Integration Studies), Bonn 2000
30. Peter van Ham, *European Integration and the Postmodern Condition*, op.cit., p.99
31. Robert O. Keohane, *Hobbes's Dilemma and Institutional Change in World Politics. Sovereignty in International Society*, in: Hans-Henrik Holm/Georg Sorensen (eds.) *Whose World Order? Uneven Globalization and the End of the Cold War*, Boulder: Westview 1995, p. 177
32. Peter van Ham, *European Integration and the Postmodern Condition*, op.cit., pp.112 ff.
33. Svein S. Andersen/ Kjell A. Eliassen, *Democracy: Traditional Concerns in New Institutional Settings*, in: Svein S. Andersen/Kjell A. Eliassen (eds.), *The European Union: How Democratic is it?* Op.cit., p. 253
34. Karl Magnus Johansson/Peter Zervakis (eds.), *European Political Parties between Cooperation and Integration*, Baden-Baden: Nomos 2001
35. Ulrich Beck, *Was ist Globalisation?*, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 1997
36. Martin Albrow/Darren O'Byrne, *Rethinking State and Citizenship under Globalized Conditions*, in: Henri Goverde (ed.), *Global and European Polity?*, op.cit., pp. 65 ff.;
37. Craig N. Murphy, *Globalization and Governance*, in: Roland Axtmann (ed.), *Globalization and Europe*, op.cit. ,pp. 144 ff; Frank Vibert, *Europe Simple, Europe Strong*, Cambridge: Polity Press 2002
38. Stefan A. Schirm, *Globalization and the New Regionalism. Global Markets, Domestic Politics and Regional Co-Operation*, Cambridge: Polity Press 2002
39. Kjell Goldmann, *Transforming the European Nation-State. Dynamics of Internationalization*, London: Sage Publishers 2001
40. Henryk Kierzkowski (ed.), *Europe and Globalization*, New York: Palgrave 2002